



CENTRE FOR VOTERS INITIATIVE & ACTION

Cameroon

NGO Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee

State Party Report: 146th Session
(October 2026, Geneva)

Submitted: 21 September 2026
Contributor contact: Alexis Schwarz
Contributor email: aschwarz@cvia.ch
Website: www.cvia.ch

Thematic Focus: Article 25 / Political Participation

Table of Contents

<i>Introduction</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Systemic Barriers to Civic Education and Participatory Access.....</i>	<i>2</i>
Disruption of education and civic formation in conflict-affected areas.....	2
Chronic underinvestment in education	4
Poverty as a constraint to education	5
Gender disparities in educational access	6
<i>Lack of Voting Access.....</i>	<i>7</i>
Legal and administrative barriers to electoral registration.....	7
Conflict-driven barriers to electoral access.....	8
<i>Violence and Intimidation Undermining Political Participation.....</i>	<i>8</i>
Intimidation and targeting of Opposition Candidates	8
Use of military force against protesters and civilians	9
<i>State-Driven Erosion of the Electoral Process.....</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Recommendations Summarised</i>	<i>11</i>

Introduction

1. The Centre for Voters Initiative & Action presents this report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee ahead of the 146th Session for the review of Cameroon. The Centre is a non-governmental organisation based in the Americas with an international focus. The Centre acknowledges there can be no secure tomorrow without ensuring civil societies have knowledge to vote, participate, and engage with the democratic processes.
2. The Centre works with multiple international mechanisms to convey dialogue, conduct research, and bring awareness to the thematic issues of electoral engagement around the world. We closely follow and participate in the United Nations human rights mechanisms in Geneva and abroad, including the Human Rights Committee.
3. The Centre presents this submission ahead of the 146th session of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (the 'Committee'), where it will consider Cameroon's periodic report. Recognising the complex and evolving nature of the challenges Cameroon faces regarding civic space, gender equality, and the treatment of minority communities, the Centre hopes to provide valuable information to the Committee regarding the State's compliance with issues affecting Article 25. This report is focused on the scope of Article 25, and we encourage Committee members to understand civic education as a foundational tool for addressing the violations outlined below.
4. The Centre has submitted this petition to the Committee to focus on four specific violations: (1) systemic barriers to civic education and participatory access; (2) lack of voting access; (3) violence and intimidation undermining political participation; and (4) state-driven erosion of the electoral process. A complete list of recommendations is at the end of this submission. We hope that the Committee will consider including some of these recommendations in their concluding observations to the State.

Systemic Barriers to Civic Education and Participatory Access

Disruption of education and civic formation in conflict-affected areas

5. The access to education across Cameroon has been severely hindered by two simultaneous conflicts, the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North and the Anglophone crisis in the North-West and South-West regions. As a result, an estimated 4,000 schools remain closed or non-operational across these affected regions.¹

¹ WINKLER Kim, Cameroon: « 60% gap in funding for education is putting girls at risk of forced marriage and abuse, warns IRC », *International Rescue Committee*, (23 March 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

6. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported 81 education-related attacks by separatist groups in 2025.² There were more than 88 attacks on education reported between January and June 2026 alone.³ In total, more than 1.4 million school-age children were estimated to need education assistance, as consequence of conflict, displacement, and violence.⁴ While these school closures serve as tools to enforce boycotts or assert territorial control, children are rendered instruments rather than protected non-combatants, which directly violates the principles of the Oslo Declaration on Safe Schools, which Cameroon endorsed in 2018.⁵
7. In the Anglophone regions, 2,463 schools have closed, resulting in at least 223,749 children out of school.⁶ Anglophone separatist groups, specifically Ambazonia factions, frequently attack, threaten, and abduct students and teachers, which includes the burning, destruction and lootings of schools.⁷ Several incidents have occurred, including 5 teachers being kidnapped and a police officer killed in Wum, September 2026,⁸ and the abduction of 15 students from the Kumbo Bilingual Public High School (GBHS) by Ambazonian secessionist fighters in February 2026.⁹ These school closures represent 41% of schools within the region, and 25% of children between the ages of 3 and 17 being unable to attend school.¹⁰
8. In the Far North regions, the Boko Haram insurgency's explicit targeting of schools reflects their rejection of the Western French- or English- language curriculum. While direct attacks on schools and abductions of students have notably declined, this has not translated into a full recovery of the education system. The 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview determined that 625,737 children from this region are out of school with 119 schools in the Far North remain closed as a result of clashes between the armed groups in the region.¹¹ Moreover, their attacks in Cameroon's Far North region should not be examined in isolation but understood with consideration to their continued activity in the wider Lake Chad Basin, suggesting a possible geographic redistribution of the threat rather than its resolution.

² GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, Cameroon, (16 March 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ See information found in GLOBAL EDUCATION MONITORING REPORT TEAM, « Global education monitoring report 2026: access and equity, countdown to 2030 », (2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁵ GLOBAL COALITION TO PROTECT EDUCATION FROM ATTACK, *Cameroon is 81st Country to Endorse Safe Schools Declaration*, (10 September 2018). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁶ KINGAH L.J., « 223,749 Children Out of School as 2,463 Schools Shut Down in Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis – UNICEF », *Pan African Visions*, (19 September 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁷ See *supra* note 2.

⁸ AL JAZEERA STAFF & AFP, « Attackers kill police officer, kidnap teachers in Cameroon's northwest », (9 September 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁹ AFRICA PRESS, « Kidnapping de 15 Élèves à Kumbo, Région de Bui », (13 February 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

¹⁰ ATABONG BLAISE Amindeh, « Almost half a million Cameroonian children are out of school », *Development and Cooperation*, (20 February 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

¹¹ POUHE Patricia, « Helping children in Cameroon to tackle trauma », *Norwegian Refugee Council*, (5 May 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

9. Not only do conflict-driven disruptions affect the educational prosperity of young Cameroonians but there are several other long-term risks associated. With a lack of education, there is an increasing risk of recruitment of children into non-state armed groups. Girls, especially, are increasingly vulnerable to poverty, exploitation, and gender-based violence being more prone to early forced marriage and child labour.¹²

We urge the Committee to press Cameroon to ensure a verifiable implementation of the Oslo Declaration on Safe Schools, including the enshrinement of guidelines on protecting schools from attack and safeguarding students. The Committee should encourage Cameroon to develop and resource a plan to reopen and reconstruct schools in the North-West, South-West and Far North regions with clear and publicly reported timelines.

Cameroon should also provide resources and funding for initiatives like the Accelerated Curriculum for the Reintegration of Dropout Children (CARED), in order to reintegrate children who have been out of school. We urge the Committee to insist on Cameroon's protection of teachers and students in cases of abduction and threats to prevent further students and civilians at risk.

Chronic underinvestment in education

10. In 2025, Cameroon has only allocated 2.8% of its GDP to education, a decline of 0.4 percentage points from the previous year, placing the country significantly below the UN recommended benchmark of 6% of GDP, or 20% of the national budget.¹³ At 2.8%, Cameroon is well below the continental average of 3.71%, ranking 27th out of 38 African countries.¹⁴ This underinvestment places severe strains on schools, forcing many operational costs onto families as informal costs despite public education being free as guaranteed by the 1996 constitution.¹⁵ Persistent underfunding of education will compound, leading to a widening gap between the population's real education attainment and enrolment figures.
11. There are large infrastructural and resource limitations to educational facilities that function as a barrier to enrolment and retention. In terms of the availability of teachers, a study conducted by the World Bank documented the student-teacher ratio of 49:1, which is a significant increase from the recommended ratio of 30:1.¹⁶ This creates a greater strain on the educational infrastructure available to Cameroonian students.

¹² See *supra* note 1.

¹³ GEO FACTBOOK, *Education Expenditure (% of GDP) in Cameroon (2008 - 2025)*, (28 March 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#). Kindly note that information from GEO FACTBOOK is sourced from the CIA World Factbook.

¹⁴ THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, *Education spending, percent of GDP - Country rankings*, (2023). Accéder [en ligne](#). Kindly note that the data is sourced from UNESCO.

¹⁵ See *supra* note 4.

¹⁶ BREKK Frida Martine, « Educational Challenges in Cameroon », *Broken Chalk*. Accéder [en ligne](#).

12. Moreover, another study conducted by the Cameroon Ministry of Basic Education in 2025 discovered a significant lack of basic facilities, where schools lack desks, chairs, and often classrooms. Even more, few public preschools have a canteen and only 16% have electricity.¹⁷ Most schools are underfunded, this further results in a failure to create optimal learning environments to motivate students. The lack of internet access and digital infrastructure provides another obstacle for educational institutions in Cameroon.

We urge the Committee to enquire why Cameroon has not progressively increased their education expenditure towards the UN-recommended benchmark of 6% of GDP. The Committee should also ensure Cameroon's elimination of informal fees in public schools through the governmental allocation of funds, maintenance, and basic operating costs from the national budget.

Moreover, Cameroon should launch a nationwide infrastructure programme targeting basic deficits, including classrooms, electricity, bathrooms, and canteens. This also includes dedicating resources to expanding teacher training capacities and educational training facilities to produce more teachers.

Poverty as a constraint to education

13. Exclusion from education due to poverty leaves families to make the difficult choice of whether to subject their children to domestic or child labour. Unfortunately, the opportunity cost involving in sending children to school often far outweighs the economic benefits of child labour. Free primary education is constitutionally guaranteed, however hidden fees of an average of CFA 7,500 (USD 13.40) still exist due to insufficient governmental assistance of school materials.¹⁸ Secondary education and higher education require tuition fees, where secondary education costs an average of CFA 34,200 (USD 60) per year.¹⁹ Access is especially difficult since 40% of the Cameroonian population live below the poverty line, and cannot afford education as a path for their children.²⁰
14. Child labour levels reached 39% among children from 5 to 17 years old, according to available UNICEF and ILO child labour data, placing the country among the highest rates in the world.²¹ Affected children are concentrated primarily in agricultural and industrial sectors, with a relatively even distribution of boys and girls.²² This pattern suggests that child labour is less a gendered phenomenon, but rather as a result of broader security and economic pressures affecting the Cameroonian population.

¹⁷ See *supra* note 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ BROWN Nikki, « Barriers to Education that Children Living in Poverty Face », *Children of Cameroon*, (1 September 2020). Accéder [en ligne](#).

²⁰ See *supra* note 4.

²¹ WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, *Child Labor by Country*, (2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

²² BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR AFFAIRS, Report on Cameroon - Child Labour Situation, (2022). Accéder [en ligne](#).

15. First, the ongoing conflict with non-state armed groups, including the Boko Haram and separatist groups have caused mass internal displacement, disrupting household livelihoods and pushing children into income-generating work. Secondly, the destruction of schools by the separatist and insurgent factions have effectively reduced the available educational facilities and restricting schooling as a viable option for many families. Thirdly, high underlying poverty levels across Cameroon suggest a greater reliance on child labour to meet basic household subsistence needs.

We urge the Committee to ensure the introduction of a means-tested subsidy or scholarship programmes by Cameroon, for students attending secondary education that are below the poverty line, to allow more students to advance their schooling careers and offset the opportunity cost of child labour.

Gender disparities in educational access

16. There are significant gender disparities in each of the educational levels achieved by girls or boys within Cameroon. According to 2024 data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, girls complete primary school at a rate of 66%, compared to 73% for boys. This creates a gap of seven percentage points that reflects an unequal participation in the earliest years of schooling. This gap persists in secondary education, where the enrolment rate for girls was 43%, whereas 48% of boys enrolled.
17. The trend continues for tertiary education, where only 13% of women enrolled compared to 15% of men.²³ Low educational attainment, especially for girls, is in part due to high levels of child marriage and early childbearing, which curtail their schooling in favour of early domestic and reproductive responsibilities. This consequence has long-term economic effects, where reduced educational achievement translates into diminished labour market participation, with female labour force participation being 56.6% in comparison to the men's 73.9%, which has decreased since 1990.²⁴

We urge the Committee to ensure Cameroon's creation of nationwide schooling programmes that promote and incentivise girls to continue their schooling careers. We appeal to the Committee to exhort Cameroon in strengthening legal protections against child marriage and establish re-integration programmes for girls who have left school due to early marriage or pregnancy to return to schools. This also includes the introduction of vocational training or apprenticeships for those who left formal education, to build necessary skills to prevent high unemployment.

²³ UNESCO, *Cameroon: Education Country Brief*, (January 2024). Accéder [en ligne](#).

²⁴ WORLD BANK GROUP, « Cameroon Gender Data Portal », (2024). Accéder [en ligne](#).

Lack of Voting Access

Legal and administrative barriers to electoral registration

18. The legal voting age of Cameroon is 20, as mandated by section 45 of the Electoral Code, which sharply contrasts with the country's median age of 19.2 years as of 2026.²⁵ This effectively excludes roughly half of the national population from the electoral participation by law, gravely impeding youth engagement and representation in the political process. Several civil society organisations like Vote 18 Advocacy have, as a result, called for the legal voting age to be lowered to 18. While a voting age of 18 is not codified in any legally binding instrument but is observed internationally, the necessity of reform in Cameroon rests on the exclusion of a demographically dominant youth population.
19. Severe administrative backlogs in the distribution of voter cards, which are imperative for citizens to cast a ballot, have resulted in many registered citizens unable to participate in voting procedures. Cameroon's Director General of Elections has explained these delays to persistent problems with the country's card printing infrastructure.
20. While the introduction of biometric voter cards in 2012 has contributed to a greater production, the overall issue has persisted due to widespread failures in the collection of voter cards. 350,000 cards remain uncollected in the Littoral Region, 65,000 in the South Region, and 34,000 in the South-West Region.²⁶ In order to rectify regional delays, Cameroon has launched an enrolment campaign in the Far North region in August 2025, yet the initiative remains geographically limited and not extended nationwide.²⁷

We urge the Committee to press Cameroon to lower the legal voting age from 20 to 18, aligning Cameroon to international standards as well as its demographic reality. Cameroon should also establish a dedicated committee to resolve and clear backlogs in voter card production and collection. The Committee is encouraged to urge Cameroon to support civil society organisations to spread awareness or public information campaigns on registration requirements and deadlines.

²⁵ WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, *Cameroon*, (1 January 2026). Accéder [en ligne](#).

²⁶ MACDONALD Ayang, « Cameroon signals urgency on biometric voter ID collection as presidential vote nears », *Biometric Update* (11 September 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

²⁷ ID TECH, *Cameroon Launches Rapid Biometric ID Program in Far North to Address Displacement and Delays*, (4 August 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

Conflict-driven barriers to electoral access

21. Electoral violence in the Anglophone and Far North regions in Cameroon severely constrains electoral access for citizens. These two regions combined represent 28.75% of all Cameroonians registered to vote.²⁸ Past elections have illustrated the strong correlation between voter turnout and security concerns, where the 2018 elections showed a 10% voter turnout in Anglophone regions, in comparison to the national rate of 54%.²⁹ This trend of electoral suppression with violence also occurred before the October 2025 elections, where Anglophone separatist groups imposed a six-week lockdown with the aim of boycotting the presidential election on October 12th.³⁰ This climate of violence significantly deterred citizens from travelling to polling states, even while they remained open. The lockdown also triggered a surge in attacks on civilians, contributing to an atmosphere of fear when going to the electoral polls.

We urge the Committee to strongly entreat the Cameroonian government to adopt security measures to protect the safety of voters in conflict zones, as well as ensuring the cessation of hostilities during the electoral week and committing to the non-harming of civilians during this time.

Violence and Intimidation Undermining Political Participation

Intimidation and targeting of Opposition Candidates

22. Opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who declared himself the winner of the October 12th, 2025, presidential election has been subject to several accounts of intimidation and threats. Most notably, on October 30th, Tchiroma announced the abduction of two of his family members and his personal cook in Garoua, which he publicly commented on as a direct attempt of coercing him into abandoning his contestation of the October presidential election results.³¹ This is a direct incident of opposition intimidation, and an undermining of the right to political participation guaranteed under Article 25 of the ICCPR.

Please proceed to the next page.
Veuillez passer à la page suivante.

²⁸ PEMBOURA Aicha & HOINATHY Remadji, « Can Cameroon secure access to the ballot for those in conflict zones? », *Institute for Security Studies*, (10 October 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS NETWORK, « Cameroon – Key Message Update », (September 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#). Note that, under the formal title, FEWS notes how the “intensifying conflict further undermines food access in conflict-affected areas”.

³¹ LIMAN Dalhatu, « Cameroon Opposition Leader Alleges Abduction Of Family Members, Chef », *Daily Trust*, (31 October 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

23. The Cameroonian government has threatened to trial Tchiroma on the basis of allegedly inciting violent post-election demonstrations, an accusation that the opposition leader has countered, attributing responsibility for the violence to the actions of the state security forces.³²
24. The threat of prosecution contradicts Cameroon's constitutional right guaranteeing freedom of assembly, particularly as the protest resulted due to a disputed election result, not an incitement to violence. As a result, Tchiroma has fled to The Gambia, seeking refuge based on humanitarian grounds.³³ Legitimate opposition to President Biya and his party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement, has been severely constrained during the October 2025 elections, where the leading presidential opponent in Cameroon has been forced to seek temporary residence abroad.

We urge the Committee to call on Cameroon to withdraw the threatened prosecution of Tchiroma on the basis of an incitement to violence and order the release of the Tchiroma's two family members and personal cook.

Use of military force against protesters and civilians

25. Cameroonian security forces employed excessive and unnecessary force in response to the opposition-led peaceful protests that broke out October 26th, 2025, following the Constitutional Council's announcement that President Paul Biya won re-election with 53.66% of the vote.³⁴ According to the Human Rights Watch, 48 people were killed during the protests while opposition sources claim the death toll was 55.³⁵ Sources indicated the use of lethal force including tear gas, water cannons, and live ammunition against unarmed protesters.³⁶
26. The scale and lethality of the state's response greatly exceed the standard codified by the 2005 Code of Criminal Procedure, in which a law enforcement official may use 'reasonable force necessary' or in the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, which permit lethal force only when strictly unavoidable to protect life. Following the protests, 149 pro-opposition lawyers documented the names of 312 people detained by security forces.³⁷ Of those detained, 154 have yet to be presented before a judge, blatantly violating the due process guarantees of judicial review. Several other documented cases highlight individuals held in detention with limited access to their lawyers.

³² NJIE Paul, « Cameroon's opposition leader in The Gambia after fleeing for his safety », *BBC News*, (24 November 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *Cameroon: Killings, Mass Arrests Follow Disputed Elections*, (12 November 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ WORLD ORGANISATION AGAINST TORTURE, *Cameroon: Excessive use of force must stop amid post-election protests*, (31 October 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

³⁷ See *supra* note 34.

27. One such case involves a 63-year-old engineer who was reportedly beaten by gendarmes upon arrest and detained without charge since October 30th, without proof of his involvement in the protests.³⁸ The protests illustrate the widespread removal of two primary safeguards, judicial oversight and legal representation, in order to punish any expression of sympathy for the opposition.

We urge the Committee to insist on Cameroon's immediate and unconditional release all individuals detained solely on the basis of peaceful protest activity or peaceful political expression. Cameroon should prohibit the use of live ammunition by police and gendarmerie members against unarmed protestors, and establish an independent, impartial commission of inquiry to investigate and prosecute all incidents of physical abuse and mistreatment during and after the October 2025 protests. The 312 documented detainees should be guaranteed to be brought before a judge without delay. Cameroon should ensure immediate and unrestricted access to legal counsel.

State-Driven Erosion of the Electoral Process

28. Cameroon's electoral commission ELECAM excluded Maurice Kamto, a key opposition leader to President Biya in the national elections scheduled for October 12th, 2025. Kamto, who had come second during the 2018 presidential election with 14% of the vote,³⁹ was excluded with the justification by ELECAM of a 'plurality of nominations', namely that the party sponsoring Kamto, the African Movement for New Independence and Democracy (MANIDEM), was also sponsoring another candidate Dieudonné Yebga.⁴⁰ Kamto was one of the 83 prospective candidates rejected, with only 13 being approved by ELECAM.⁴¹ There are strong concerns about the credibility of the electoral process, regarding the capacity of opposition candidacies to genuinely contest the incumbency and how they are withdrawn from Cameroon's candidate-vetting procedures.
29. The vice presidency position was reinstated in Cameroon on the 4th of April 2026, following a vote of 200 in favour, 18 against, and 4 abstentions at the National Assembly.⁴² This amendment to the Cameroon constitution gives the president absolute authority over the office of the vice president, including the appointment and delegation of powers. According to the amendment, the vice president will serve as interim president for the remainder of the presidential tenure in the case that the president dies, resigns, or becomes incapacitated.⁴³

³⁸ See *supra* note 34.

³⁹ NEWS AGENCIES, « Cameroon bars main challenger to longtime leader from presidential race », *Al Jazeera*, (26 July 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁴⁰ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *Cameroon: Main Opposition Candidate Barred from Elections*, (29 July 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁴¹ See *supra* note 39.

⁴² KILLIAM CHINTOM Ngala, « Cameroon lawmakers revive vice presidency, handing aging president sweeping control over the post », *AP News*, (5 April 2025). Accéder [en ligne](#).

⁴³ *Ibid*.

30. Members of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) praised the legislation in its effectiveness to ensure institutional stability, but the Cameroon Bar Association have warned that the law reduces democratic and electoral legitimacy with a presidential appointment.⁴⁴ No vice president has been appointed until now.

We urge the Committee to pressure Cameroon to reinstate the eligibility of Maurice Kamto in future elections and require ELECAM to publish, at the point of decision, a full legal reasoning behind any candidate's expulsion. Cameroon should introduce an independent review body for Constitutional Council rulings and ensure that any future appointment of a vice presidency is procedurally transparent for the public.

Recommendations Summarised

31. The numerous violations to article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been demonstrated in the aftermath and analysis of the October 2025 presidential elections, in which Biya was re-elected to his eighth presidential term. Should these violations continue, Cameroon will see further erosion of democratic principles and legitimacy. In response to the current situation and issues outlined in this report, we urge the Committee to do the following:
- a. The Committee should ensure the implementation of the Oslo Declaration on Safe Schools as well as the supervision of protocols to guarantee the protection of schools, students, and teachers from attacks, abductions or threats followed by investigation and prosecution.
 - b. The Committee should monitor the reopening and reconstruction of damaged schools in the North-West, South-West and Far North regions as well as the reintegration programmes for children who have been out of school.
 - c. The Committee should oversee and verify the increase of Cameroon's education expenditure, ensuring the allocation of funds to eliminate informal fees, the correction of infrastructural deficits and the provision of educational resources and materials.
 - d. The Committee should supervise the increase of secondary school enrolment figures through means-tested subsidies or scholarship programmes.
 - e. The Committee should urge Cameroon to lower its voting age from 20 to 18, to include roughly half of the national population in electoral processes, as well as solve the backlog in voter card production and collection.
 - f. The Committee should monitor the enforcement of security measures that protect the safety of voters and civilians in conflict zones, including but not limited to the cessation of hostilities during the electoral week.
 - g. The Committee should investigate Cameroon's withdrawal of Tchiroma's threatened prosecution and investigate the release of Tchiroma's family members and personal cook.

⁴⁴ See *supra* note 42.

- h. The Committee should enforce the release of all individuals detained on the basis of peaceful protest activity or peaceful political expression.
 - i. The Committee should ensure the prohibition of live ammunition use by political and gendarmerie members against unarmed protectors. In line with this, an independent commission of inquiry should be monitored to investigate and prosecute incidents of physical abuse during and after the October 2025 protests.
 - j. The Committee should investigate the impartiality of the Constitutional Council, as well as call for the reinstatement of Maurice Kamto in future elections.
 - k. The Committee should examine the appointment and justification of the future vice president.
32. Civic engagement and political participation constitute the fundamental pillars upon which Cameroon's democratic legitimacy can be upheld. The recommendations set out above respond to the numerous threats faced by these pillars, including inadequate and conflict-disrupted civic education, structural barriers to electoral registration and participation, as well as persistent use of violence against participants in the political sphere.
33. We kindly appeal to the Committee to remember that civics education is the most valuable tool in securing a more prosperous tomorrow; we hope the Committee will recognise that and take this, along with other recommendations, to the table. We look forward to the interactive dialogue which will follow.
34. This submission may be published on the OHCHR website or any other places necessary. For any enquiries regarding this submission, please contact:

Alexis SCHWARZ / Civil Society Representative
aschwarz@cvia.ch

Samad QURAISHI / Executive Director
squraishi@cvia.ch

Centre for Voters Initiative & Action Inc.
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, P.O. 294
Washington, D.C. 20004